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WAGNER VS. FARMERS INSURANCE 
The Brief of Appellee discusses the case of Wagner vs. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 1990). This 
case was not referred to in Appellant's Brief for three reasons: 
(1) the factual circumstances were somewhat different, (2) the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is not controlling before 
this Court, and (3) the present case raises new issues not 
considered by the Court of Appeals in Wagner. However, Farmers 
reference to this case does raise a "new matter" as described in 
Utah R. App. Proc. 24(c). This "new matter" should be addressed 
in more than passing reference. 
The Wagner case involved a decedent who died in a motor 
vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, the decedent was 
riding as a passenger in his own car which was driven by a friend 
who had little or no insurance. The decedent had purchased an 
insurance policy with underinsured policy limits of $100,000.00 
and his wife claimed after his death that she should be paid 
$100,000.00 in damages for the death of her husband. The insurance 
company relied on a clause in the policy identical to the one which 
is at issue in this case. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 
clause at issue served to limit the liability of the insurance 
company to $20,000.00. 
Plaintiff's major argument in Wagner was directed 
towards the "reasonable expectations of the insured" issue. Mrs. 
Wagner claimed that her husband had purchased insurance which he 
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reasonably believed would provide coverage of $100,000.00 under the 
circumstances of his accident, and that those reasonable 
expectations should be honored by the Court and the insurance 
company. 
The reasonable expectations theory is something that 
should be considered by the Court in this case. The insurance 
policy at issue in this case stated: 
We will pay damages for which any insured 
person is legally liable because of bodily 
injury to any person and property damage 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or 
use of a private passenger car, a utility car, 
or a utility trailer. 
Many paragraphs later, under the heading "Other 
Insurance,11 the insurance company placed the following language: 
We will provide insurance for an insured 
person, other than you or a family memberf up 
to the limits of the financial responsibility 
law only. 
In analyzing the provisions of an insurance policy, it 
must be borne in mind that they are not typical contracts, the 
terms of which are bargained for by the parties. As this Court 
noted in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 
1985), 
Automobile insurance is generally sold through 
adhesion contracts that are not negotiated at 
arm's length. Purchasers commonly rely on the 
assumption that they are fully covered by the 
insurance that they buy. 
An insurance purchaser generally requests particular 
categories of coverage (liability, uninsured motorist) in 
particular amounts and the insurer responds by sending out a policy 
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which purports to grant such coverage. To the extent that the 
policy issued, by its terms, unreasonably excludes the very 
coverage requested its terms should not be literally applied. As 
one scholar has indicated: 
The objectively reasonable expectations of the 
applicant and intended beneficiaries regarding 
the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of the 
policy provisions would have negated those 
expectations. 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 
83 Harv.L.Rev. 961, 967 (1970). 
Public policy "requires that persons purchasing 
automobile insurance policies are entitled to be informed, in 
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially 
exclusionary terms." Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, supra, at 236. 
If this information is provided by a writing which can only be 
understood by a lawyer, it is unreasonable to assume that the 
policy purchaser has been placed on notice regarding the way in 
which the policy issued deviates from the coverage requested. 
Therefore, to apply the policy's literal terms would be to allow 
the insurer to accept the applicant's "offer" by issuing a policy 
which is, in reality, a counteroffer, though the applicant doesn't 
understand it to be such. 
Much has been written in recent years concerning the 
emergence of the "new" theory of honoring the reasonable 
expectations of insureds when construing insurance contracts. See, 
e.g., Abraham, Judge Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring 
the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va.L.Rev.; 1151 
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(1981); Keeton, Supra. Proper analysis of the reasonable 
expectations theory, however, demonstrates that it is neither a new 
nor radical approach to contract law. As the Supreme Court of 
Arizona noted in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984): 
"Emergence" is probably an inaccurate 
description of the use of the reasonable 
expectations test since, if correctly 
understood, that doctrine has long been a 
basic principle in the law of contracts. 
682 P.2d at 394. 
The essence of the reasonable expectations approach to 
insurance policies is simply that certain standardized boiler plate 
provisions of insurance contracts, which are almost invariably 
contracts of adhesion, don't in fact correctly state the real 
"agreement" made between an insured and an insurer's selling agent. 
i 
Though courts have, on occasion, blurred the distinction, it is 
important to remember that while a written standardized policy "may 
be coextensive with the agreement, it is not the agreement but only 
evidence thereof." Murray, The Parole Evidence Process and 
Standardized Agreements under the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1342, 1389 (1975). Indeed, as another 
commentator has acknowledged: 
Any contract with boiler-plate results in two 
several contracts: the dickered deal and the 
collateral one of supplementary boiler-plate. 
Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, 371 (1960). 
As noted by the Court in Darner, supra: 
Thus, in insurance law, as in other areas of 
contract law, the parole evidence rule has not 
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been strictly applied to enforce an illusory 
"bargain" set forth in a standardized contract 
when that "bargain" was never really made and 
would, if applied, defeat the true agreement 
which was supposedly contained in the policy. 
682 P.2d at 396. 
The principle of construing adhesion contracts in a 
manner which would honor the reasonable expectations of the insured 
was adopted by the California Supreme Court in the leading case of 
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.. 65 Cal.2d 263, 419 P.2d 168 (1966): 
Although courts have long followed the basic 
precept that they would look to the words of 
the contract to find the meaning which the 
parties expected from them, they have also 
applied the doctrine of adhesion contract to 
insurance policies, holding that in view of 
the disparate bargaining status of the parties 
we must ascertain that meaning of the contract 
which the insured would reasonably expect. 
419 p.2d at 171-172. 
Justice Durham, in a dissenting opinion in State Farm vs. 
Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) discussed issues of reasonable 
expectation and adhesion contract theories: 
Judicial determination of the insured's 
reasonable expectations does not necessarily 
depend upon the presence of an ambiguity in 
the policy. (Citations omitted.) Indeed, the 
insured's complete failure to read the 
policy's provisions, exclusions, or 
limitations, may not be determinative of his 
reasonable expectations unless the insurer can 
demonstrate that the failure to read was 
unreasonable. (Citations omitted.) 
Though Justice Durham's opinion was dissenting, it 
appears that her opinion was actually in the majority, except as 
to her conclusion that the "household exclusion clause" (which was 
at issue in that case) should be held invalid even prior to the 
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amendments to the insurance code made in 1986. 
The insurance contract at issue, like all insurance 
contracts, is a contract of adhesion. It is a contract filled with 
numerous provisions, clauses, limitations and exclusions. The 
average person could not be expected to understand the limitation 
or exclusion which the insurance company claims is provided by the 
clause at issue in this case. The average person would reasonably 
expect that he had purchased insurance which would provide coverage 
of $100,000.00 to himself, any family member, or any person using 
his car with his permission. The reasonable expectations of the 
insured should be honored. 
POINT II 
ALLSTATE INS. CO. V. U.S. FIDELITY & GUARANTEE CO. 
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE IN THIS CASE 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 619 
P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), also relied upon by Appellant, was a case 
which was decided under prior Utah law, which law has now been 
amended. In that case, USF&G had insured Brookfield Products with 
a motor vehicle liability policy. USF&G then reviewed the records 
of Brookfield employees who had been listed as potential drivers 
of Brookfield vehicles. After reviewing these records, USF&G 
notified Brookfield that it would not provide coverage for an 
employee by the name of Pulliam. Brookfield then took steps to 
insure that Pulliam would not drive its vehicles. However, a 
situation later arose where no one was available to drive except 
Pulliam, and Brookfield therefore allowed Pulliam to drive its 
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truck to Heber City. Pulliam became involved in an accident which 
resulted in the death of another driver insured by Allstate. 
Allstate paid the estate of the deceased driver under its 
uninsured motorist coverage. Allstate then filed a declaratory 
judgment action against USF&G alleging that it was illegal to 
attempt to exclude coverage for Pulliam and any other permissive 
user. This argument was based on Section 41-12-20(b)(2) of the 
former statute, which provided: "(An) owner's policy of liability 
insurance . . . shall insure the person named therein and any other 
person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles 
with the express or implied permission of such named insured..." 
The Supreme Court accepted this argument. However, the 
Supreme Court also ruled that the coverage required for permissive 
users would not be required to extend above and beyond the minimum 
statutory requirements. The Court stated, "Rather, contracting 
parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum 
required limits, and the exclusion found in the contract is valid 
in relation to any coverage exceeding the minimum amounts." (Id. 
at 333) In so ruling the Court specifically referred to former 
Section 41-12-21(g) which stated: "Any policy which grants the 
coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also 
grant any lawful coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability 
policy and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject 
to the provisions of this Act . . . " 
There are major differences between the statute which 
was in force at the time the Allstate case was decided, and the 
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statute which is applicable to this case. There is no provision 
in the Utah Insurance Code in existence today which specifically 
states that coverage in excess of the minimum statutory 
requirements are not subject to the No-Fault Act. Rather, there 
are specific provisions regarding those circumstances when coverage 
may be limited for permissive users. 
The Legislature established a commission to revise the 
Insurance Code in 1981. This commission consisted of many of the 
finest legal and insurance minds in the state and spent four years 
and countless man hours before finally recommending its revision 
to the Legislature in 1985. That revised statute has now been 
adopted by the Legislature. Certainly this Court must conclude 
that the Legislature believed that the statute in existence prior 
to 1985 was inadequate. Therefore, case law based on the prior 
inadequate statute certainly has no precedential or binding effect 
on this Court today. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31A-22-303(1)(C) DOES NOT 
EVIDENCE ANY LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO ALLOW LOWER COVERAGE 
FOR PERMISSIVE USERS IN ALL SITUATIONS 
Farmers relies upon Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-
303(1)(c) which states as follows: 
Except as provided in subsection (7) , [a 
policy of motor vehicle liability coverage . 
. . shall] insure persons related to the named 
insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship who are residents of the named 
insured's household, including those who 
usually make their home in the same household 
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but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same 
extent as the named insured. 
Farmers argues that this provision which omits any 
reference to permissive users, provides evidence of a Legislative 
intent to allow permissive users to be insured in a lesser amount 
than the insurance required for the named insured and related 
persons. 
Farmers has conveniently ignored the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 31A-22-303(2) (c) and (d) . Without quoting 
these provisions verbatim (they are quoted in Plaintiff's prior 
Brief) these sections state that coverage for permissive users may 
be limited to the minimum statutory amount in those situations 
where a "motor vehicle business" is involved. Plaintiff has argued 
previously that the Legislative intent evidenced by these 
provisions is to allow lower coverage for permissive users only in 
the situation where a "motor vehicle business" is involved. There 
is thus apparent conflict between 31A-22-303(1)(C) and 31A-22-
303(2)(c) and (d). 
Legislators presumably do not intend to draft statutes 
which have conflicting provisions, or which contain provisions 
which are redundant or meaningless. It is an elementary principle 
of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed to be 
internally harmonious if such construction is possible. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245 (Utah 1988); Weitekamp v. Fireman Fund 
Insurance Company, 709 P.2d 908 (Ariz. App. 1985); Matter of Estate 
of Estes, 718 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1986). Another fundamental principal 
of statutory construction is that the language and provisions of 
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a statute should be construed so as to render all parts of the 
statute relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations which 
would render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd should 
be avoided. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation. 609 P. 2d 934 
(Utah 1980); State v. Tabaha, 714 P.2d 1010 (N.M. App. 1986); State 
v. Flores. 772 P.2d 589 (Ariz. App. 1989). 
If, as Farmers argues, the Legislature intended by the 
language in 31A-22-303(1)(c) to allow an insurance company, in all 
situations, to provide lesser coverage to a permissive user than 
to the named insured and his relatives, then the question must be 
answered as to why the Legislature would, in the very next section 
of the statute, discuss specific limited situations in which 
coverage for permissive users can be so limited. Put another way, 
if Section 303(1)(c) is interpreted as Farmers argues, then the 
provisions of Section 303(2)(c) and (d) are rendered meaningless, 
redundant, and of no consequence. 
This Court must assume that the Legislature intended to 
do something meaningful by enacting Section 303(2)(c) and (d) . 
This Court must further assume that the Legislature intended that 
the provisions of Section 303(1)(c) and 303(2)(c) and (d) could be 
understood and interpreted in a harmonious and consistent manner. 
With these principles in mind, a harmonious and 
consistent construction between the two sections of the statute is 
possible. Likewise, an interpretation which gives effect to both 
of the provisions is possible. Such construction is possible if 
we assume that the Legislature, in enacting Section 303(1)(c), 
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intended that there would be some situations where permissive users 
for an insured's vehicle would not have the same coverage as the 
insured and related parties. We can then assume that the 
Legislature went on in subsection 303(2)(c) and (d) to delineate 
those circumstances (i.e., involving motor vehicle businesses) when 
a permissive user could be granted lower coverage than those 
provided to the named insured and related parties. 
Such construction harmonizes and gives full effect to 
what would otherwise be conflicting provisions of the statute. In 
fact, the above interpretation is the only interpretation which 
gives meaning and effect to both of the otherwise conflicting 
provisions. It is therefore the only reasonable interpretation 
which this Court can adopt. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 31A-21-106 PROHIBITS INCORPORATION BY 
REFERENCE OF "ANY PROVISION" 
Farmers has argued that Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-
21-106, prohibiting insurance contracts which incorporate by 
reference, does not apply to incorporation by reference of a 
statute. This argument ignores the plain provisions of the statute 
which clearly state: 
No insurance policy may contain any agreement 
or incorporate any provision not fully set 
forth in the policy . . .(Emphasis added.) 
Despite this clear and unequivocal language, Farmers 
argues that statutes are automatically incorporated by reference 
into every insurance contract, citing the authority of Appleman 
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Insurance Law and Practice. Section 7382, at pages 23 and 24 which 
states: 
Insurance policies are governed by statutory 
requirements in force and effect at the time 
such policies are written. Such provisions 
are read into each policy issued thereunder 
and become a part of the contract with full 
binding effect upon each party. Such 
provisions being a part of the contract by 
implication, they cannot be contracted away by 
either party. (Emphasis added.) 
This authority, with which Plaintiffs agree, cannot be 
interpreted as Farmers suggests. Insurance statutes are intended 
to govern and restrict insurance companies, and provide protection 
to insurance purchasers. Thus, an insurance company cannot prepare 
an insurance contract which is contrary to the mandates of the 
insurance statute, and thereby deprive an insured of protection or 
benefits which the Legislature has mandated that the insured be 
provided. 
In this regard, the statute is automatically a part of 
every policy, protecting the insured from being taken advantage of 
by the insurance company. It is only in this respect that the 
statute is incorporated by reference into every insurance contract. 
It is untenable to suggest that this principle should be invoked 
to allow an insurance company to prepare a contract which creates 
greater confusion and uncertainty for the insured, in contradiction 
of the clear mandates of the statute. 
Farmers claims that Plaintiffs have cited no authority 
to support their position that incorporation by reference in the 
contract is not allowed. This is curious in view of Plaintiff's 
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clear reliance on the statute. Indeed, what greater authority than 
the statute could be cited. In reality, it is Farmers which has 
cited no authority which would support its position that any 
statutory provision can be incorporated by reference even though 
that provision is not a requirement of the law. 
Farmers claims that a sample paragraph proposed in 
Plaintifffs Brief is in itself an acknowledgment that incorporation 
by reference is acceptable. The differences in the proposed 
paragraph and the actual language at issue used by Farmers are 
obvious. The proposed language clearly sets forth the limitation 
and only makes reference to the statute to provide further clarity. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The insurance clause at issue violates the reasonable 
expectations of purchasers of insurance. On that basis alone, it 
should be struck down. Furthermore, the insurance policy violated 
the statute in two respects: (1) it attempted to limit coverage for 
permissive users to the minimum levels of the Financial 
Responsibility Law contrary to those situations specified in 31A-
22-303(2) (c) and (d) ; and (2) it attempted to incorporate by 
reference a provision which was not expressly recited within the 
contract. 
The Insurance Code was rewritten after extensive study 
and with an express view to protect the rights of the insured from 
unscrupulous activities of insurance companies. Farmers 
contractual provision is in violation of the law and is therefore 
of no effect, and this Court should so rule. 
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